Country: Iraq

Years: 1945-1952

Leader: Abdul-Ilah

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as none. Lentz (1999) does not identify leader’s ideology but notes his “moderate pro-Western policies brought him in conflict with some of the more militant Arab nationalists in the region”.

Years: 1953-1957

Leader: Faisal II

Ideology:

Description: CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as none. Tripp (2007) writes “King Faisal II came of age and assumed his full constitutional powers as head of state in May 1953. ‘Abd al-Ilah thereupon lost his formal powers as regent and was accorded the rank of crown prince. This had little effect, however, either on his determination to play a key role in politics or on his ability to do so through the networks of protégés and associates which he had established over the years. The king himself was young and had been brought up under the aegis of ‘Abd al-Ilah. He therefore had little political vision and had not had the time to develop a political personality of his own. His circle of acquaintances was the same as that of the crown prince and consequently, when Jamil al-Midfa’i offered his resignation in August… the king consulted the crown prince and Nuri before asking Fadhil al-Jamali to form a government.”

Years: 1958-1962

Leader: Abdul Karim Kassem

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identify leader’s party as none. Bill (1969: 53) identifies Kassem’s ideology as left: “Kassem and the military officers who seized power in Iraq in 1958 came to rely very heavily upon the support of Communist groups… Because large numbers of men within the military came to share the same values as these opposition civilian groups and because Kassem was forced to move against his own main base of civilian support (the Communists) in order to maintain his independence, he did not fare as well as his counterparts in Egypt…”

Years: 1963-1965

Leader: Salem Aref

Ideology: Leftist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. CHISOLS identifies leader party as IIA. Perspective monde identifies leader’s party as Arab Socialist Union. Axtmann (2001) notes “On 8 February 1963 an alliance of pan‐arabist forces, the *Ba’th* party and the army, overthrew Qasim's regime; Aref took over the presidential office and on 18 November 1963 removed Premier Ahmad Hasan al‐Bakr and the *Ba’thist* National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) from power. He banned all political parties and founded the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as a single party structured after the model of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union.”

Years: 1966-1967

Leader: Rahmen Aref

Ideology: Leftist

Description: Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. CHISOLS identifies leader party as IIA. Perspective monde identifies leader’s party as Arab Socialist Union.

Years: 1968-1978

Leader: Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as Ba’ath. Perspective monde identifies leader party as Ba’ath. DPI does not identify Ba’ath’s ideology. In V-Party (2020) 1 expert identifies leader party’s ideology as “Left” (-2.083) in 1970 and 2 experts identify leader party’s “Left” (-2.235) in 1975. Perspective monde identifies leader’s ideology as moderate left. Cammett et al. (2015: 187) identify Ba’ath as left: “this party called for Arab unity and socialism and has tried to propagate its message throughout the Arab world”. Political Handbook of the World (2006) notes that Baath lead “the right wing of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (*Hizb al-Baath)”.* Rulers notes that “His economic policy began with a cautious continuation of the former regime's five-year plan but turned toward industrial expansion as oil revenues increased.” Axtmann (2001) notes “On 17 July 1968 the *Ba’th* party led by General Ahmad Hasan al‐Bakr and Saddam Hussein al‐Takriti took power. Since then the Arab Socialist *Ba’th* Party (ASBP) has dominated public life.”

Years: 1979-2002

Leader: Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as Ba’ath. Perspective monde identifies leader party as Ba’ath. DPI does not identify Ba’ath ideology. In V-Party (2020) 1 expert identifies leader party’s ideology as “Left” (-2.235) in 1975, “Left (-1.626) in 1980, “Center-left” (-1.03) in 1989 and “Center-left” (-1.61) in 1996 and 2000. Perspective monde identifies leader ideology as moderate left. Cammett et al. (2015: 187) identify Ba’ath as left: “this party called for Arab unity and socialism and has tried to propagate its message throughout the Arab world.” Political Handbook of the World (2006) notes that Baath lead “the right wing of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (*Hizb al-Baath)”.* Axtmann (2001) notes “On 17 July 1968 the *Ba’th* party led by General Ahmad Hasan al‐Bakr and Saddam Hussein al‐Takriti took power. Since then the Arab Socialist *Ba’th* Party (ASBP) has dominated public life. Shortly after the 1968 revolution Saddam Hussein emerged as the *strong man* of the regime. In 1979 he became Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), President of the Republic and Chief of the Armed Forces.” Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist.

Year: 2003

Leader: Lewis Paul Bremer III

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as United States. Dobbins et al. (2009) notes Bremer is the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and identifies it as right: “The COA economic policy has been criticized as being naively ideological in its devotion to deregulation and free-market principles” and “The economic policy of the CPA… was to blend of wild-eyed and hopelessly unrealistic radical reforms, supposedly to introduce a liberal market economy.” Ortiz de Zárate (2018) writes “Abadi and his CGI colleagues came into conflict with Bremer over the US administrator's decrees to impose an ultra-liberal market economy framework in Iraq, with minimal regulations and controls, as well as the privatization of most of the country's state-owned companies, including those providing basic infrastructure services. The economic dictates of the occupying power preceded the transfer of power and sovereignty to Iraqi authorities with electoral legitimacy. Abadi left the Cabinet when the Interim Government of Iraq was formed in June 2004, which, with the secular Shiite Iyad Allawi, leader of the Iraqi National Accord (INA), at its head, received formal sovereignty from the now dissolved CPA.”

Year: 2004

Leader: Iyad Allawi

Ideology: Center

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as Iraqi National Alliance (INA). Perspective Monde identifies Allawi’s ideology as centrist. World Statesmen (2020) identifies Allawi’s party as INA and the INA as centrist, “Iraqi National Accord, centrist, liberal, secular, anti-Saddam, illegal until 2003, est. 1991.” The Encyclopedia Britannica notes “Allāwī was chosen as one of the 25 members of the U.S.-backed provisional governing council” and later “was named prime minister of the interim government [where] Allāwī adopted a policy of trying to [reconcile](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reconcile) with Baʿthists.”

Year: 2005

Leader: Ibrahimal-Shiqral-Jaafari

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as Islamic Dawa Party (IDM). World Statesmen identifies IDM as right-wing: “IDM = Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Dawa Party, Shia islamist, Islamic democracy, right-wing, banned 1980-2003, est.1957)”. Ortiz de Zárate (2005) writes “Dawa, also called Hizb Ad Da'wa Al Islamiyah or Dawa Islamic Party (DIP), took shape between 1957 and 1958 on the initiative of a group of Shiite notables from the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. This collective, made up of clerics and laymen, and emulating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, sought to invigorate Islamic culture and society, which it considered to be in decline, and was quick to resist secular reformist policies, socialist and pro-women's rights policies implemented by the regime of General Abdel Karim Kassem and then brought to their peak, with different ideological foundations, by the successive dictatorial governments of Nasserist and Baathist majority… Beyond purely reactive actions against the established order, the Dawa elaborated a long-term program in which the Islamic revolution and the theocratic state appeared as goals worthy of being achieved through a thorough doctrinal preparation of the masses.”

Years: 2006-2013

Leader: Nuri Kamilil-Maliki

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader party as IDM. World Statesmen identifies IDM as right-wing: “IDM = Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Dawa Party, Shia islamist, Islamic democracy, right-wing, banned 1980-2003, est.1957).” Ortiz de Zárate (2005) writes “Dawa, also called Hizb Ad Da'wa Al Islamiyah or Dawa Islamic Party (DIP), took shape between 1957 and 1958 on the initiative of a group of Shiite notables from the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. This collective, made up of clerics and laymen, and emulating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, sought to invigorate Islamic culture and society, which it considered to be in decline, and was quick to resist secular reformist policies, socialist and pro-women's rights policies implemented by the regime of General Abdel Karim Kassem and then brought to their peak, with different ideological foundations, by the successive dictatorial governments of Nasserist and Baathist majority… Beyond purely reactive actions against the established order, the Dawa elaborated a long-term program in which the Islamic revolution and the theocratic state appeared as goals worthy of being achieved through a thorough doctrinal preparation of the masses.” Hasan (2019) writes “This was manifested in the crucial role played by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a Shia cleric who became Dawa’s patron and key ideologue. In his writings, Sadr tried to present Islam as an alternative to liberalism and communism, while asserting the role of Shia clergy in political leadership”.

Years: 2014-2017

Leader: Haider Jawad Kadhim Al-Abadi

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as IDM. Political Handbook of the World identifies Al-Abadi’s party as IDM. World Statesmen identifies IDM as right-wing: “IDM = Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Dawa Party, Shia islamist, Islamic democracy, right-wing, banned 1980-2003, est.1957)”. Ortiz de Zárate (2018) writes “Abadi and his CGI colleagues came into conflict with Bremer over the US administrator's decrees to impose an ultra-liberal market economy framework in Iraq, with minimal regulations and controls, as well as the privatization of most of the country's state-owned companies, including those providing basic infrastructure services.” Ortiz de Zárate (2005) writes “Dawa, also called Hizb Ad Da'wa Al Islamiyah or Dawa Islamic Party (DIP), took shape between 1957 and 1958 on the initiative of a group of Shiite notables from the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. This collective, made up of clerics and laymen, and emulating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, sought to invigorate Islamic culture and society, which it considered to be in decline, and was quick to resist secular reformist policies, socialist and pro-women's rights policies implemented by the regime of General Abdel Karim Kassem and then brought to their peak, with different ideological foundations, by the successive dictatorial governments of Nasserist and Baathist majority… Beyond purely reactive actions against the established order, the Dawa elaborated a long-term program in which the Islamic revolution and the theocratic state appeared as goals worthy of being achieved through a thorough doctrinal preparation of the masses.” Hasan (2019) writes “This was manifested in the crucial role played by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a Shia cleric who became Dawa’s patron and key ideologue. In his writings, Sadr tried to present Islam as an alternative to liberalism and communism, while asserting the role of Shia clergy in political leadership”.

Years: 2018-2019

Leader: Abdul-Mahdi

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as none. Perspective Monde (2020) identifies head of government’s party as independent. Perspective Monde (2020) does not identify head of government’s ideology. World Statesmen (2020) identifies Abdul-Mahdi’s party as non-party. Ortiz de Zárate (2018) writes “His long stay in France made Mahdi at the time a fervent ultra-left communist, specifically of the Maoist tendency… In 1982, Mahdi, without leaving his French refuge, redefined his radical opposition to Saddam from positions that entailed a 180-degree ideological shift: he renounced Marxism, a materialist doctrine hostile to religion, and embraced the confessionalism of Shiite Islam, the faith that ran in his family. It was the beginning of an equally intense militancy in the Supreme Congress for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a resistance party organized in the safe rear of Tehran by the cleric Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim and other notable Shiites fully identified with the ideological principles of the regime that emerged from the 1979 revolution in the neighboring country. From the beginning, the SCIRI, a splinter of the Islamic Dawa Party, was seen as a mere instrument of Iran's ayatollahs, eager to undermine the power of the Baath and the Sunni clan of Saddam Hussein, enemies at open war since the 1980 invasion by the Baghdad Army, by bringing into combat a powerful fifth column of Iraqi Shiites loyal to Khomeinism.” Makiya (2020) writes “Abdul Mahdi… In his youth in the 1960s, he was a committed member of the Ba‘th Party’s National Guard and then became a follower of the Maoist split in the Iraqi Communist Party in the late 60s and early 70s. This was followed by a turn to political Islam, ending up after the revolution of 1979 as an ardent Shi‘a sectarian and leading member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Throughout the 1990s, he remained a loyal follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the former Supreme Leader of Iran, and the underlying principles of extending the Islamic Revolution outside Iran. This personal trajectory combined with a French education in economics… [made] Abdul Mahdi… a favorite of the CPA; they saw in him the perfect Shi‘a Islamist moderate to preside over post-Saddam Iraq… But, despite his colorful history, in an important sense Abdul Mahdi had never changed. He was not, and probably had never been, a “democrat,” as that word is usually understood. He believed in “consensus” politics, which, as he described it to me in February 2003 during discussions we had in northern Iraq as members of the Iraqi opposition, involved forcing minorities (read Sunni Arabs) to accept majority views (read Shi‘a Iraqis) as represented by “mass parties” (read SCIRI).””

Years: 2020

Leader: Al-Kadhimi

Ideology:

Description: Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as none. Perspective Monde (2020) identifies head of government’s party as none and does not identify head of government’s ideology. World Statesmen (2020) identifies leader’s party as none.

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